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Pronuptia de Paris v. Schillgalis:
Permissible Restraints of Trade
on Franchising in the EEC
I. INTRODUCTION
The international franchising community breathed a collective sigh
of relief when the Court of Justice of the European Communities
("Court" or "Court of Justice") issued its decision on distribution
franchising agreements, Pronuptia de Paris v. Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard
Schillgalis,' in January 1986. The decision had been eagerly awaited be-
cause it was the Court's first opportunity to rule on the restraint of trade
I Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v. Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgalis, [1986] 1 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 414. The text of the original decision is in German. The case has not yet been officially re-
ported in the Report of Cases Before the Court of Justice of the European Communities. An official
English translation, Judgment of the Court, is available from the Court of Justice of the European
Communities ("Court" or "Court of Justice"). The Common Market Law Reports contains an
unofficial translation, as does 4 Common Market Reporter (CCH) % 14,245 (1986). An abbreviated,
provisional translation is contained in the Proceedings of the Court of Justice of the European Com-
munities No. 3/86 (Jan. 27-Feb. 7, 1986). Quotations used in this Note are from the Common
Market Law Reports to the extent that the meaning corresponds to the Court's translation. Refer-
ences to the Judgment of the Court are noted.
Professor Ren6 Joliet was the judge-rapporteur for Pronuptia, and Professor Pieter VerLoren
van Themaat was the advocate general. "The judge-rapporteur and the advocate general follow the
development of the case throughout and consider themselves responsible for the progress of the
proceedings and the preparation of a basis for a solution." P. PESCATORE, COURT OF JUSTICE OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, INFORMATION FOR LAWYERS 21 (1983). Professor Pescatore fur-
ther explains the role of the judge-rapporteur:
For the purposes of the oral hearing, the judge-rapporteur has the responsibility of establishing
a 'report for the hearing' which is a public document... set[ting] out all the particulars of the
case, indicating the parties, the facts alleged or established, the submissions presented to the
Court and a concise summary of the legal arguments. Parties may make any observations on
this report which will finally reappear as the introductory part of the judgment itself ["Facts
and Issues"].
After hearing the advocate general, the Court deliberates on the matter in private session.
The discussion is opened by the judge-rapporteur who presents the Court with a written intro-
ductory note, or an oral statement as he thinks fit; he may also introduce immediately a draft
judgment or reserve the right to formulate his draft after a first round of discussion ....
According to the degree of difficulty of the case, there may be two or more successive readings
of the drafts presented by the judge-rapporteur.
Id. at 22-23.
Professor Pescatore, with experience at the Court as both judge-rapporteur and President of
Chamber, also notes that the "majority decision constitutes the opinion of the Court. The Court
rules do not provide for the expression of any sort of individual opinions, dissenting or concurring."
Id. at 11.
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aspects of franchise contracts.2 The Court held that franchising3 was a
legitimate business activity in its own right, distinct from exclusive distri-
bution systems, and that restrictive contract clauses strictly necessary to
preserve franchising's unique nature were justified. Further, by its com-
ments on the types of clauses usually contained in franchise agreements,
the Court recognized the "practical importance of many of the normal
franchising practices to the successful operation of a franchising net-
work." 4 The decision cannot be seen as the foundation for an application
of a "rule of reason" for the European Economic Community ("EEC"),
but it is an advance in the use of ancillary restraints which promote com-
petition within the Common Market.
In its decision, the Court of Justice recast an economic phenomenon
as an independent legal concept. Before Pronuptia, franchise contracts
were evaluated by examining separate aspects of the franchisor-fran-
chisee relationship, an unsatisfactory process at best. Commentators
have long recognized the hybrid nature of franchising, "which typically
partakes of a number of ... relationships, while not totally embracing
2 Pronuptia, [1986] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 442, 13.
3 In his opinion in Pronuptia, Advocate General VerLoren van Themaat supplied the following
general description of franchising:
Franchising is a contractually governed form of commercial cooperation between independent
undertakings, whereby one party, the franchisor, gives one or more other parties, the franchis-
ees, the right to use his trade name or mark and other distinguishing features, in the sale of
products or of services. The sale takes place on the basis of an exclusive marketing concept
(system or formula) developed by the franchisor; in return, the franchisor receives royalties.
The use of those rights by the franchisee is supervised by the franchisor in order to ensure
uniform presentation to the public and uniform quality of the goods or services.
Id. at 422 (quoting Kneppers-Heynert, Franchising en de handelsnaam: What's in a name?, 1984
BIJBLAD INDUSTRIELE EIGENDOM No. 10 at 251).
The role of the advocate general has been explained as follows:
'[A]cting with complete impartiality and independence, to make, in open court, reasoned sub-
missions on cases brought before the Court, in order to assist the Court in the performance of
the tasks assigned to it.' These duties should not be confused with those of a public prosecutor
or similar kind of functionary such as the advocate-general in a French court. The advocates-
general do not represent the Communities and cannot initiate proceedings themselves.
THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, PERIODICAL 4/1983 8 (1983). P. PEs-
CATORE, supra note 1, at 10, comments that the role of public prosecutor is entrusted to the Com-
mission of the European Communities ("Commission").
Albert Van Houtte, former Registrar of the Court, asks, "Might it be said that the opinion of
the Advocate General is equivalent to a judgment given at first instance? ... [I]is independence and
the publicity given to his opinion constitute an important safeguard for parties whose cases are dealt
with by a court of first and last instance." A. VAN HOUTTrE, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 9 (1984).
4 B. Harris, Franchising in Europe: The Judgment in the Pronuptia Case (Remarks at the
Meeting of the European Franchising Federation, Mar. 25, 1986, Brussels, Belgium-a one day
conference on "The Pronuptia Judgment and Its Impact on Franchising, Distribution and Licens-
ing")[hereinafter Pronuptia Conference].
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any of them."5 The marketing relationships include: "(1) employer and
employee; (2) distributorship; (3) licensor and licensee; (4) agency; or
(5) vendor and purchaser, to varying degrees, depending upon individual
transactions."6 The Court in Pronuptia acknowledged that franchising is
more than the sum of its parts, giving legal recognition to the synergy
present in franchising components.
The Pronuptia decision can best be understood by examining the
extent to which it furthers Common Market economic goals. Franchis-
ing breaks down territorial barriers by making widespread use of single
trademarks, thereby encouraging the concept of a single common mar-
ket. Further, franchise networks increase the free movement of goods
within the Common Market, thereby enhancing competition by provid-
ing additional sources to compete for the consumer's attention. Pronup-
tia thus recognizes and endorses franchising as a vehicle for promoting
economic unity and progress, and to a great extent the decision provides
legal certainty for the use of this new economic force.7 In its decision,
the Court noted that franchise agreements are very diverse and carefully
limited the judgment to distribution franchise agreements. 8
5 Pengilley, International Franchising Arrangements and Problems in Their Negotiation, 7 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 185, 186 (1985).
6 Id.
7 Goebel, The Uneasy Fate of Franchising Under EEC Antitrust Laws, 10 EUR. L. REv. 87
(1985)[hereinafter Uneasy Fate]. In an article written about the Pronuptia case while it was pending
before the Court, Goebel recites the benefits of franchising. It provides new market entry, because in
many franchising networks the "retail franchise outlet provides the products and services of a
number of different manufacturers, in competition with existing department stores, independent re-
tailers and in many cases with the manufacturer's own outlets." Further, franchising exerts a down-
ward pressure on price without affecting quality standards and expands rapidly to cover large areas
of the EEC. "This means that consumers in many different EEC countries have a greater opportu-
nity to obtain the same type of products and services on an easy and convenient basis." Id. at 92.
The Commission has also commented favorably on the positive effects of franchising. Those
effects include: 1) enabling small retail outlets to compete with large distribution firms; 2) letting the
franchisor establish a uniform distribution network without building its own retail outlets; 3) helping
new competitors enter the market and thus increasing interbrand competition; and 4) aiding in the
creation of a single European market due to the effect on cross-frontier development. COMMISsION
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FIFTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 40, 25 (1986).
For an examination of franchising and its antitrust implications in the EEC written several
years before the Pronuptia decision, see Adams, Franchising and Antitrust in the United Kingdom
and European Community, 26 ANTITRUST BULL. 815 (1981). For an analysis of the business com-
munity's reaction to the EEC's goal of a unified market, see Waelbroeck, Competition, Integration
and Economic Efficiency in the EEC From the Point of View of the Private Firm, 82 MICH. L. REv.
1439, 1442-44 (1984).
8 Service franchise agreements and production franchise agreements were specifically excluded
from the Court's decision. The Court defined the three types of franchise agreements as follows:
1) distribution franchise agreements are situations in which "the franchisee restricts himself to the
sale of certain products in a shop carrying the mark of the franchisor;" 2) service franchise agree-
ments are situations in which "the franchisee offers services under the sign and the trade name, or
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Why is franchising so popular among franchisors and franchisees
alike? The Court noted that a distribution franchise system similar to the
one used by Pronuptia de Paris has benefits for both sides. The
franchisor can financially exploit its commercial knowledge without in-
vesting its own capital. The franchisee lacking the necessary experience
gains ready access to commercial methods which it "could otherwise
only acquire after prolonged effort and research and [is] allow[ed] also to
profit from the reputation of the mark."9 Thus, the small entrepreneur
can enter a larger world of commerce by payment of franchising fees and
adherence to the franchising agreement.
Franchising is a recent economic phenomenon. It has caused a
rapid revolution in the business community since the 1970s, accounting
for $33 billion of total annual sales in the EEC, or 10% of the total an-
nual EEC retail market.1" The European Franchising Federation esti-
mates that in 1983 there were approximately 1,904 franchisors with
61,704 outlets in 11 European countries. By 1987, the European Eco-
nomic Commission ("Commission") noted that there were 85,000
franchised outlets in the EEC, belonging to 1,500 franchise networks."
Statistics show a similar impact in representative EEC member states:
500 franchisors in France with 25,000 outlets, and 200 franchisors in
indeed the trade mark, of the franchisor and complies with the franchisor's directives;" and 3) pro-
duction franchise agreements are situations in which "the franchisee himself manufactures, accord-
ing to the instructions of the franchisor, products which he sells under the franchisor's trade mark."
Pronuptia, [1986] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R at 442, S 13. See infra note 103 and accompanying text for
the Commission's definition of franchising.
9 Id. at 442, 15. Van Empel has noted that the core of the franchising concept is:
the finely tuned compromise between outside uniformity and internal independence: ... after a
certain period of time the emphasis is bound to shift in the mind of the franchisee: having grown
familiar with the format, and thus becoming more sophisticated himself, he is bound to appreci-
ate less what the system has to offer to him and to resent more what he has to do and pay in
return.
Van Empel, Franchising in the EEC. Pronuptia et Post, 20 J. WORLD TRADE L. 401, 402-03
(1986)[hereinafter Franchising in the EEC].
10 U. S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, FRANCHISING IN THE ECONOMY, 1984-1986 (1986)[hereinafter
FRANCHISING IN THE ECONOMY], cited in P. Zeidman, Franchising Around the World, Remarks at
the Pronuptia Conference, supra note 4.
11 The 11 countries identified by the European Franchising Federation are: Belgium, France,
United Kingdom, West Germany, Italy, Portugal, Sweden, Denmark, Greece, Norway, and Spain.
Sales of automobiles, trucks, gasoline (service stations), and soft drink bottlers are excluded; this
data excludes hotels, except for West Germany. EUROPEAN FRANCHISING FEDERATION,
FRANCHISING IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMY (1985), cited in M. Clough, Franchising in Europe
After the Pronuptia Case, Remarks at the Pronuptia Conference, supra note 4. See also Franchising
Agreements Exempt from Community Rules on Competition, 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) % 10,894
(July 16, 1987)[hereinafter Agreements Exempt]; EC Commission Moves Toward Flexibility in Evalu-
ating Restrictions in Franchises, 53 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. 96 (July 16, 1987)[hereinafter Com-
mission Flexibility].
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Germany with 120,000 outlets. 12 United States franchisors have also had
a significant impact on the EEC; by 1984, there were 68 franchisors from
the United States with 4,427 outlets in continental Europe, and 60
franchisors from the United States with 2,456 outlets in the United
Kingdom. 3
This Note examines the Pronuptia decision for the legal definition
and substantial support it gives to the franchising concept. 14 When com-
pared to the Court's prior decision in Etablissements Consten SARL and
Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission, 5 Pronuptia is seen to promote
a more liberal interpretation of the EEC Treaty's competition article, Ar-
ticle 85. However, Pronuptia falls short of the advances made in Nun-
gesser KG v. Commission,16 because some territorial restraints allowed
under Article 85(1) in that case were not permitted in Pronuptia. The
Court's approach in Pronuptia to the doctrine of ancillary restraints is
also discussed. Use of this doctrine is a step forward in a "rule of rea-
son" analysis in which the Court may be engaged in the future.'7 Reac-
tions to the case from the Commission and the international franchise
community are reported.' 8 Finally, the Note evaluates the Pronuptia de-
cision in light of the economic goals that it has advanced, and the legal
certainty that it has given to the burgeoning economic force of
franchising.
II. THE PRONUPTIA DECISION
A. Factual Background
The Pronuptia case arose out of a franchisee's failure to pay royalty
fees. Mrs. Irmgard Schillgalis was in arrears on the 10% royalty fees
owed to her franchisor, the German subsidiary of Pronuptia de Paris (the
French world leader in wedding dresses and accessories). Mrs. Schill-
galis had franchise agreements with Pronuptia de Paris for the contract
territories of Hamburg, Oldenburg, and Hannover, and she owed DM
158,502 (approximately $93,815) in royalties and interest on her turnover
from 1978 to 1980. Mrs. Schillgalis complained that Pronuptia de Paris
had not supplied the commercial and technical assistance specified in the
12 Pronuptia, [1986] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 421.
13 FRANCHISING IN THE ECONOMY, supra note 10.
14 See infra notes 25-42 and accompanying text.
15 1966 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 299, [1966] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 418. See infra notes 43-57 and
accompanying text.
16 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2015, [1983] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 278. See infra notes 58-78 and
accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 79-92 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 93-109 and accompanying text.
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franchise agreement.19
Pronuptia de Paris sued in German court for recovery of the fees,
and won at the trial court level. Mrs. Schillgalis appealed, presenting as
her defense that the franchise agreement violated Article 85(1) of the
EEC Treaty2" and that Council Regulation 67/67-the block exemption
for certain exclusive dealing arrangements--did not apply. (Although
Regulation 67/67 has been superseded by Regulation 1983/83, the pro-
ceedings first arose under Regulation 67/67.)21 The Oberlandesgericht
(Appeals Court) agreed with Mrs. Schillgalis and quashed the trial
court's judgment. The Appeals Court "held that most common franchis-
19 Venit, Pronuptia: Ancillary Restraints.-Or Unholy Alliances, 11 EUR. L. REV. 213, 219
(1986).
20 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11,
art. 85 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1958)[hereinafter EEC Treaty]. This translation is taken from
EUROPEAN COMMUNmES, TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 285 (1978).
Article 85 provides:
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all agreements
between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which
may affect trade between Member States, and which have as their object or effect the preven-
tion, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market, and in particular those
which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices for any other trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby
placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supple-
mentary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no
connection with the subject of such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of any
agreement or category of agreements between undertakings; any decision or category of deci-
sions by associations of undertakings; any concerted practice or category of concerted practices;
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting techni-
cal or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and
which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the
attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a sub-
stantial part of the products in question.
See generally Comment, Article 85 and European Antitrust Litigation: A Search for Economic Bal-
ancing, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1275 (1975)(for an economic analysis of Article 85); Korah, EEC Compe-
tition Policy-Legal Form or Economic Efficiency, 39 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 85 (1986)
(encouraging economic analysis of EEC competition policy)[hereinafter EEC Competition Policy].
For a current view of EEC competition policy written by Peter Sutherland before his appoint-
ment as the Commissioner responsible for competition policy at the Commission, see Sutherland,
The Competition Policy of the European Community, 30 ST. Louis U.L.J. 149 (1985). Sutherland
defines the three basic functions of EEC competition: "to allocate factors of production to their most
productive uses, to provide an incentive to firms to use their resources in the most efficient way
possible and to stimulate innovation by encouraging invention and development of new products,
services and processes." Id. at 153.
21 10 J.0. COMM. EUR. (No. L 57) 849 (1967), 0.3. EuR. COMM. (special 1967 English ed.) 10
(1972). See also infra note 27 and accompanying text.
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ing contractual provisions were anticompetitive under Article 85(1) of
the EEC Treaty,"22 specifically taking issue with clauses in the Pronuptia
agreement that the "franchisor could not supply any other trader in the
territory covered by the contract and the franchisee had only a limited
right to buy and resell other goods coming from EEC countries."23
Pronuptia de Paris then appealed to the Bundesgerichtshof (German
Supreme Court). The Bundesgerichtshof stayed the proceedings when
questions arose concerning the application of EEC law to franchise
agreements, and it referred several questions on EEC law to the Court of
Justice.24
B. The Opinion of the Court of Justice
In its response to the Bundesgerichtshof's questions, the Court es-
tablished that distribution franchise agreements are unique, because they
use a single mark, apply uniform commercial methods, and require roy-
alty payments. 25 The agreements therefore go beyond exclusive or selec-
tive distribution systems. Had the Court adopted the reasoning of the
German lower court, "franchising would have been virtually outlawed in
Europe,"" unless exempted by Regulation 67/67. The Court held that
Regulation 67/67, which exempted certain restrictions in exclusive dis-
tribution and purchase agreements for sale, did not apply to distribution
22 Crossick & Mendelsohn, Franchising in Europe: Consequences of Pronuptia, 14 INT'L BUS.
LAW. 220 (1986).
23 Franchise Agreement Dividing Market May Run Afoul of EEC Competition Laws, 50 Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 506 (1986).
24 The questions were referred to the Court by use of the procedure established in Article 177 of
the EEC Treaty, supra note 20. For a discussion of the drawbacks to an Article 177 reference, see
generally Ulrich, The Impact of the "Sirena" Decision on National Trademark Rights, 3 INT'L REV.
INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. (IIC) 193 (1972), reprinted in EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND
INSTITUTIONS 857 (E. Stein, P. Hay & M. Waelbroeck eds. 1976).
The manner in which the German Supreme Court phrased its questions to the Court of Justice
in the Pronuptia case has been criticized because the questions suggested that the German Supreme
Court considered franchising "merely as a form of 'distribution system' and fail[ed] to recognize
that franchising is sui generis and requires treatment as such under EEC competition law." Cros-
sick, The Pronuptia Case and Its Effect on EEC Franchising Law, 13 INT'L Bus. LAW. 294, 295
(1985).
The questions were asked within the context of four key clauses in Mrs. Schillgalis's franchise
agreement with Pronuptia de Paris. At the oral hearing, the Court of Justice heard arguments on
the two most important: "1. the confinement of sales to particular business premises; 2. the fran-
chisee's obligation to buy most of its supplies from the franchisor and the rest from suppliers ap-
proved by the franchisor." Of lesser importance to the Court were the two remaining clauses
covering "3. controls over advertising; [and] 4. commercial support by the franchisor," and the
Court heard no oral argument on them. Id.
25 Pronuptia, [1986] I Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 443, 15.
26 Crossick & Mendelsohn, supra note 22, at 220.
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franchise agreements.27
The Court determined that there are two essential conditions for the
operation of a distribution franchise system: 1) the communication of
know-how and franchisor assistance in its application; and 2) the preser-
vation of the identity and reputation of the network symbolized by the
mark.2" Restraints of competition imposed on franchisees which are
strictly necessary to protect the two essential conditions for operating a
distribution franchise system ("ancillary restraints ' 29) do not constitute
serious restrictions of competition within the meaning of Article 85(1) of
the EEC Treaty.3" Additionally, the Court held that Regulation 67/67,
the block exemption for exclusive dealing agreements, did not apply to
27 See generally Korah, Group Exemptions for Exclusive Distribution and Purchasing in the EEC,
21 COMM. MKT. L. REv. 53 (1984)(discussing Regulation 67/67's provisions, supra note 21, and
how they were modified by its successor regulation, Regulation 1983/83, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
L 173) 1 (1983)); V. KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EEC COMPETITION LAW AND PRAC-
TICE (3rd ed.) 73-80 (1986)(for an explanation of Regulation 1983/83). For a description of the
policy behind Regulation 67/67, see Downes, Exclusive Dealing Agreements: A Change for the
Worse?, 4 EUR. L. REV. 166, 171 (1979):
[The creation of a common market involves competition across national boundaries without
hindrance between undertakings in different Member States; to facilitate this a manufacturer in
one Member State should be permitted to enter into an exclusive dealing agreement with a
distributor in another Member State so that he may compete more effectively on that market.
But this applies only to exclusive dealing agreements across the boundaries between Member
States ....
For an examination of the relationship between Article 85 and exclusive supply agreements, selective
distribution systems, and exclusive purchasing agreements, see generally Chard, The Economics of
Exclusive Distributorship Arrangements With Special Reference to E.E.C. Competition Policy, 25 AN-
TITRUST BULL. 405, 420-36 (1980).
28 Pronuptia, [1986] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 443, 16, 17.
29 The Court did not use the United States term "ancillary restraints" in its decision. Judgment
of the Court f 16, 17, 27. However, the "strictly necessary" restraints explained by the Court in the
Pronuptia decision are identical in purpose to the use of ancillary restraints in United States case law.
In United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U. S. 211
(1899), Justice Taft explained ancillary restraints:
[N]o conventional restraint of trade can be enforced unless the covenant embodying it is merely
ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract, and necessary to protect the covenantee in
the enjoyment of the legitimate fruits of the contract, or to protect him from the dangers of an
unjust use of those fruits by the other party.
... [T]he contract must be one in which there is a main purpose, to which the covenant in
restraint of trade is merely ancillary .... The main purpose of the contract suggests the mea-
sure of protection needed, and furnishes a sufficiently uniform standard by which the validity of
such restraints may be judicially determined.
See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
Valentine Korah, a frequent commentator on EEC competition law, has concluded that ancil-
lary restraints as used by the Court of Justice only require a decision "whether the ancillary restraint
is necessary to make the principal transaction possible and effective: a task that national courts may
find easier [than the limited economic appraisal required by the United States caselaw in balancing
pro- and anti-competitive effects. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36
(1977)]." Korah, Pronuptia Franchising: The Marriage of Reason and the EEC Competition Rules, 8
EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 99, 103 (1986).
30 Pronuptia, [1986] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 446, 1 28.
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franchise agreements. Thus, the Court opened the door to more re-
straints of trade on franchising than are present in exclusive supply and
purchase agreements. The decision also recognized obligations assumed
by the franchisor, especially those communicating know-how and requir-
ing assistance to the franchisee.31
Permissible restraints of competition include restrictions prohibiting
the franchisee from opening a shop with an identical or similar purpose
in an area where it could be in competition with one of the members of
the franchise network during the term of the franchise or a reasonable
period thereafter. The franchisee is further precluded from selling its
shop without the franchisor's prior approval, ensuring that a competitor
does not indirectly receive the benefit of know-how and franchisor assist-
ance.32 To enable the franchisor to exercise control essential to preserv-
ing the identity and reputation of the system, the franchisee may also be
obligated to apply the franchisor's commercial methods and know-
how.3 3 Additionally, to guarantee a uniform image, the franchisee is re-
quired to sell the franchised merchandise in establishments set up and
decorated according to the franchisor's specifications.
The Court also allowed a franchisor to retain approval rights before
a franchisee's move to another location, since a shop's location may af-
fect the reputation of the network.34 Franchisor approval is also neces-
sary before the franchisee may alienate the franchise, to ensure that
qualified persons are affiliated with the network. Requiring that the
franchisee sell only products provided by the franchisor or its suppliers
protects the reputation of the network, provides certainty to consumers,
and is a practical solution to the problems of enforcing quality specifica-
tions with a large number of franchisees. The Court cautioned that this
restriction cannot prevent the franchisee from obtaining the same prod-
ucts from other franchisees.36
31 Id. at 447, 33.
32 Id. at 443, 16.
33 Id. t 18.
34 Id. 19.
35 Id. 20.
36 Id. at 444, 21. Goebel has criticized the exclusive supply obligation in the Court's decision:
There is also no reference to the possibility that market conditions might make an otherwise
appropriate exclusive supply obligation unreasonable and hence a violation of Article 85(1).
The Court was presumably motivated in its broad statement by consideration of the particular
character of the Pronuptia network i.e., the sale of high fashion articles for specific purposes,
weddings, but it seems unfortunate that the ruling gives the impression that exclusive supply
obligations, or obligations to buy only from approved suppliers, are generally to be regarded as
compatible with Article 85(1). [footnotes omitted]
Goebel, Case 161/84, Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v. Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgalis, 23 COMM.
MKT. L. REV. 683, 697-98 [hereinafter Case 161/84].
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Finally, network reputation is maintained by requiring franchisor
approval of the nature of franchisee advertising, since the franchise im-
age is projected through advertising. The Court stressed franchisor con-
trol only over the nature of advertising, instead of the ads themselves.37
Franchisor approval of the ads themselves might be viewed as a coopera-
tive effort in setting prices.
The Court found that franchise provisions regarding price competi-
tion and market partition are not essential to the preservation of network
know-how and reputation. Clauses that restrict the franchisee's com-
plete freedom to set its prices are restrictive of competition. However,
communication of recommended prices by the franchisor is not restric-
tive if there is no concerted action between the franchisor and franchisee,
or between franchisees, actually to apply those prices. 8
The Court's major attack on practices which are restrictive of com-
petition came in the area of market partition, either between franchisor
and franchisee, or between franchisees. At issue was a franchise clause
limiting the franchisee to selling merchandise covered by the agreement
only at the location specified, thus prohibiting the franchisee from open-
ing a second shop. The Court viewed this clause, in combination with
the franchisor's promise to guarantee exclusive use of the mark in a spe-
cific territory, as restrictive of competition within the franchise network
between franchisor and franchisee, or between franchisees. Market parti-
tion arises because the franchisor in this situation must obtain agree-
ments from other franchisees not to open a shop outside their own
territories, in addition to the franchisee's own promise of the same. 9
This same concern with the effect of intentional restraints on horizontal
competition with third parties was present in Consten and Grundig.40
In a brief analysis, the Court in Pronuptia also held that distribution
franchise agreements containing clauses partitioning the market between
franchisor and franchisees, or between franchisees, are themselves capa-
ble of affecting trade between Member States, even if concluded between
enterprises in the same Member State. For trade to be affected, the fran-
chisees must be prohibited from establishing themselves in another Mem-
37 Pronuptia, [1986] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 444, 22.
38 Id. at 445, 25.
39 Id. at 444, 24. If the Court had ruled Regulation 67/67 applicable to franchise distribution
contracts, location clauses would have been allowed under that group exemption (as well as its
successor Regulation 1983/83). Permission to use location clauses can be obtained from the Com-
mission via an Article 85(3) exemption if group exemptions do not apply. See infra notes 53-56, 76-
78, 99, 103, 108 and accompanying text.
40 See infra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
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ber State.41
In summary, the Court held that clauses strictly necessary to protect
franchisor know-how and control network identity and reputation are
allowable. Clauses which partition markets or restrict the franchisee's
ability to fix its own prices are prohibited. Regulation 67/67 does not
apply to the distribution franchise agreements involved in Pronuptia be-
cause of the unique nature of the franchise relationship. That relation-
ship is unique because it goes beyond the exchange of goods for money in
an exclusive dealing relationship. It is the transmission of intellectual
property, in the form of franchisor know-how, and franchisor assistance
in the application of that know-how.4 2
III. RELEVANT COURT OF JUSTICE DECISIONS
The Court's decision in Consten and Grundig supports the proposi-
tion that the Pronuptia franchise agreement partitioning the market re-
stricts competition within the meaning of Article 85(l). 4 3 That case
concerned an appeal from a Commission refusal to grant an Article 85(3)
exemption to an agreement between the parties.' Grundig, a German
sales company dealing in electronics equipment, granted a French com-
pany, Consten, exclusive rights for the sale of Grundig radio receivers,
televisions, and other electronics items in France, the Saar, and Corsica.
By granting exclusive rights to Consten, Grundig was obligated to
surrender to Consten its retail sales in the territory specified, and to re-
frain from making deliveries, either directly or indirectly, to other per-
sons established there. Additionally, Grundig prohibited its German
wholesalers and its concessionaires appointed in other countries from
making deliveries from their contract territories to other contract
territories.4 5
41 Pronuptia, [1986] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 445, 26.
42 Adams and Mendelsohn have criticized the decision because "on the whole [it] lacks precision
in that it has only provided widely drafted guidelines. The practical application of these guidelines
to the present case [Pronuptia] is remitted to the National Court." Adams & Mendelsohn, Recent
Developments in Franchising, 1986 J. Bus. L. 206, 216.
43 Pronuptia, [1986] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 444, 24.
44 An Article 85(3) exemption would have allowed clauses restrictive of competition in the dis-
tribution agreements. Sutherland, supra note 20, at 156, has commented that:
[C]ommunity law has, in Article 85(3) and block exemption Regulations... permissive rules,
which, based on an analysis of the benefits to which the arrangement gives rise in all the circum-
stances, provide that the arrangement should be enforceable despite its restrictive impact on
competition. The economic contribution to our reasonable approach is governed by the twin
goals of efficiency, seen in terms of decentralised decision making and consumer welfare, and
integration, based on our conviction that the interests of all Europeans-producer and con-
sumer alike-are best served by the creation of a genuine common market.
45 Consten and Grundig, 1966 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 353, [1966] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 420.
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Grundig's territorial restrictions were supported by a trademark ar-
rangement. "Grundig affixed two trademarks on its products, Grundig
and Gint. The manufacturer retained ownership of Grundig for itself
while enabling exclusive distributors to register the Gint trademark as
their own. It set up this arrangement merely to provide exclusive distrib-
utors with trademark relief against parallel imports of genuine goods
... ,"46 The Court took particular note of the arrangement's effect on
third parties:
[G]rundig undertook not to deliver even indirectly to third parties products
intended for the area covered by the contract. The restrictive nature of that
undertaking is obvious if it is considered in the light of the prohibition on
exporting which was imposed not only on Consten but also on all the other
sole concessionaires of Grundig, as well as the German wholesalers. 47
The Commission found and the Court agreed that the absolute terri-
torial restrictions in the agreement were restraints on competition not
needed to obtain the benefits sought. It looked to the "spirit of Article
85" in deciding whether there was an improvement in the production or
distribution of the goods, rejecting a subjective standard in which the
parties to the agreement gain an advantage from it in their production or
distribution activities. Noting that Article 85(3) requires the restriction
to be "indispensable" to the improvement, the Court held that the im-
provement must "show appreciable objective advantages of such a char-
acter as to compensate for the disadvantages which . . . [the
improvement] cause[s] in the field of competition."48
The Pronuptia decision advances a more liberal interpretation of Ar-
ticle 85 than Consten and Grundig because the "strictly necessary" provi-
sions in Pronuptia do not fall under an Article 85(3) Commission
standard of review, but can be implemented immediately without refer-
ence to individual or group Article 85(3) exemptions.49 In Consten and
46 Joliet, Trademark Licensing Agreements Under the EEC Law of Competition, 5 Nw. J. INT'L
L. & Bus. 755, 771 (1983)(the section of the article relating to territorial and exclusive licensing,
with somewhat different and less detailed footnotes, was published as Territorial and Exclusive
Trademark Licensing Under the EEC Law of Competition, 15 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPY-
RiGHT L. (IIC) 21 (1984)). A French version of the article was published as La licence de marque et
le droit europeen de la concurrence, 20 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPEEN 1 (1984).
47 Consten and Grundig, 1966 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 343, [1966] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 473.
Advocate General VerLoren van Themaat cites this reasoning to underscore the Court's concern in
Consten and Grundig with "intentional restrictions on horizontal competition." Pronuptia, [1986] 1
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 428.
48 Consten and Grundig, 1966 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 348, [1966] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 478.
49 For an Article 85(3) exemption, however, the EEC Commission has the sole power to declare
Article 85(1) inapplicable. Council Regulation No. 17, First Regulation Implementing Articles 85
and 86 of the Treaty, art. 9, 5 J.0. COMM. EUR. (No. 13) 204 (1962), O.J. EUR. COMM. (special
1959-1962 English ed.) 87 (1972).
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Grundig, the Court analyzed the meaning of "indispensable," 5 an Arti-
cle 85(3) term strikingly similar to the "strictly necessary" concept51 the
Court in Pronuptia used to determine that the majority of the franchise
clauses do not constitute restrictions on competition. The difference be-
tween the two cases, however, is that while the Court in Pronuptia used
an Article 85(3) "strictly necessary" standard to determine if there were
restrictions on competition prohibited by Article 85(1), the Court in Con-
sten and Grundig used Article 85(3) language for Article 85(3) applica-
tion. Article 85(3) uses "indispensable" as one of several criteria to
determine when Article 85(1) restraints on trade may be allowed. If re-
straints contribute "to improving the production or distribution of goods
or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consum-
ers a fair share of the resulting benefit," the EEC Treaty allows restric-
tions that are "indispensable to the attainment of these objectives .... ""
In Consten and Grundig and Pronuptia,5 3 the Court addresses mar-
ket partition in terms of its effect on third parties. The Court in Pronup-
tia states clearly that market partitioning is not strictly necessary. Any
territorial protection to be afforded to a prospective franchisee must be
obtained through an Article 85(3) exemption, even though the franchisee
"may not want to take the risk of joining the chain and making his in-
vestment, paying a relatively high entry fee and agreeing to pay a consid-
erable annual fee."54 The franchisor thus incurs a financial risk, because
only with market partition can the franchisee "hope that his business
would be profitable thanks to a certain amount of protection from com-
petition by the franchisor and other franchisees."55 In this decision, the
50 The Court explains:
Furthermore, the very fact that the Treaty provides that the restriction of competition must be
"indispensable" to the improvement in question clearly indicates the importance which the lat-
ter must have. This improvement must in particular show appreciable objective advantages of
such a character as to compensate for the disadvantages which they cause in the field of
competition.
Consten and Grundig, 1966 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 348, [1966] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 478. See also
supra note 47.
51 The official English translation, Judgment of the Court, uses "strictly necessary," as do the
Proceedings of the Court and the Common Market Reporter. "Indispensable" is used in the Com-
mon Market Law Reports. This Note uses the "strictly necessary" terminology. See supra note I.
52 EEC Treaty, supra note 20.
53 Pronuptia, [1986] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 444, q 24.
54 Id. at 444-45, 24.
55 Id. at 445, 1 24. Requesting the Commission's approval of an individual Article 85(3) exemp-
tion may not be a practical alternative. The Article 85(3) notification process requires "maximum
disclosure to the Commission of business practices as they actually [exist], and a maximum role for
the Commission in deciding whether these practices [are] acceptable and legal." Forrester & Norall,
The Laicization of Community Law: Self-Help and the Rule of Reason: How Competition Law Is and
Could Be Applied, 21 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 1I, 12 (1984). However, the volume of cases notified to
the Commission far exceeds the Commission's capacity to process them. Thus, the
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Court rejects a subjective standard by which to judge the restriction
(though the franchisee's plight is sympathetically stated).5 6 The Court
aligns the reasoning here with its reasoning in Consten and Grundig,
when it stated: "[t]his improvement cannot be identified with all the ad-
vantages which the parties to the agreement obtain from it in their pro-
duction or distribution activities. These advantages are generally
indisputable."57
Nungesser 58 is another recent case in which the Court dealt with the
issue of territorial restrictions in licensing, using a fresh legal concept to
address the restrictions. Kurt Eisele, a German seed supplier and major-
ity stockholder in the Nungesser firm, negotiated several agreements con-
cerning the German sale and distribution of French hybrid maize seed
and assigned his exclusive rights under the agreement to the Nungesser
firm. Eisele's contracts were with the Institut National de la Recherche
Agronomique ("INRA"), a French public research institute concerned
with improving and developing plant production. INRA's 1965 contract
with Eisele gave him the exclusive right to produce and distribute its
hybrid maize seed varieties in Germany. INRA also agreed to prevent
other suppliers from importing its maize varieties into Germany. In
Clause 5 of the contract, INRA "promis[ed] that it and those deriving
rights through it [would] do 'everything in their power' to prevent the
export of the varieties of seeds in question to Germany." The agreement
was notified to the Commission. 9
In 1973, the Louis David company made a parallel import60 despite
notification process has, from a functional point of view, come to be used as a law-making tool
rather than as a mechanism for approving individual cases .... The backlog of unanswered
notifications is large: 3,715 in December 1982. The number of exemptions is small: 31 in ten
years. The files containing about 2,000 notifications during the same ten year period were
closed, some because the agreements had expired, some because one or other group exemption
was available, others following informal comments from the Commission. Clearly, notification
does not work as a mechanism by which any party to an agreement caught by Article 85(1) can
obtain an exemption under Article 85(3).
Id. at 13-14.
Korah has noted that not only can the Commission manage only "a handful of exemptions each
year," but also "to obtain an exemption one must notify an agreement to the Commission and may
have to spend considerable trouble explaining the industry as well as the merits of the contested
clauses to the Commission." Korah, Critical Comments on the Commission's Recent Decisions Ex-
empting Joint Ventures to Exploit Research That Needs Further Development, 12 EUR. L. REv. 18,
20-21 (1987). See also McCullough, The Continuing Search for Greater Certainty: Suggestions for
Improving U.S. and EEC Antitrust Clearance Procedures, 6 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 803, 846-49
(1984).
56 See infra notes 76-78, 99, 103, 108 and accompanying text.
57 Consten and Grundig, 1966 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 348, [1966] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 348.
58 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2015, [1983] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 278.
59 Id. at 2018-20, [1983] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 282-84.
60 A parallel import is the import of a product from one EEC Member State to another.
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Eisele's exclusive rights, and was forced to pay Nungesser damages. The
company also agreed to refrain from selling INRA maize seeds or put-
ting them into future circulation without Eisele's consent. Subsequently
Bomberault, a parallel importer, advertised INRA maize seeds in the
German journal Erndhrungsdienst, which would not allow subsequent
advertising because of legal action threatened by Eisele and INRA's
commercial agent, Frasema. Eisele used the same journal to warn
against importing INRA seeds into Germany without his approval, and
he succeeded in warding off several German companies considering deal-
ing with Bomberault.61 Bomberault complained to the Commission,
which found part of Eisele's agreement with INRA in violation of Article
85(1) of the EEC Treaty. The Commission also denied an Article 85(3)
exemption.62 Eisele appealed to the Court of Justice.63
In determining the validity of Nungesser's arrangement with INRA,
the Court referred to the policy it had enunciated in Consten and
Grundig: "absolute territorial protection granted to a licensee in order to
enable parallel imports to be controlled and prevented results in the arti-
ficial maintenance of separate national markets, contrary to the
Treaty."' However, the Court in Nungesser employed a concept of
"open exclusive licenses or arrangements," which it differentiated from
"exclusive licenses or assignments with absolute territorial protection"
(i.e., closed exclusive licenses). The Court explained the distinction as
follows:
[O]pen exclusive licence or assignment and the exclusivity of the licence
relates solely to the contractual relationship between the owner of the right
and the licensee, whereby the owner merely undertakes not to grant other
licences in respect of the same territory and not to compete himself with the
licencee on that territory. On the other hand, the second case involves an
exclusive licence or assignment with absolute territorial protection, under
which the parties to the contract propose, as regards the products and the
territory in question, to eliminate all competition from third parties, such as
parallel importers or licencees for other territories.65
61 Nungesser, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2020-21, [1983] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 285.
62 Id. at 2021-24, [1983] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 285-88.
63 Id. at 2024, [1983] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 289.
64 Id. at 2070, 1 61, [1983] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 354, 61.
65 Id. at 2068, 53, [1983] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 352, 1 53. Korah has criticized the open
exclusive licenses from an economic point of view:
Open exclusivity gives considerable protection for products of little value where freight is an
important proportion of the cost or where a manufacturer supplies tailor-made products di-
rectly to a consumer, but virtually none where sales are made to dealers and freight costs are
unimportant. The degree of protection should depend on the proclivity of other firms to take a
free ride and the riskiness of the investment, not on how difficult it is to resell the product.
Korah, EEC Competition Policy, supra note 20, at 98.
J.D.C. Turner suggests that the open exclusivity concept is compatible with Regulation 67/67,
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After explaining this licensing concept, the Court then examined the
exclusive nature of the Nungesser license (to the extent it was an open
license) to determine if it had the effect of preventing or distorting com-
petition within the meaning of Article 85(1).66 It found that Eisele's
agreement went beyond restraints necessary for an open exclusive li-
cense, and further, that the settlement agreement reached earlier with the
Louis David firm was also in violation of Article 85(1).67
In an article written before his appointment to the Court, Professor
Rene Joliet criticized the territorial distinction used in the Nungesser case
because of the Court's view of distributorship and licensing agreements:
[T]he EC Court did not perceive the basic difference between a distributor-
ship agreement and a licensing agreement. As a result, it inadequately
transferred to licenses a distinction between open and closed agreements
which it had originally devised for exclusive distributorship agreements.
The Court apparently equated a licensor's promise not to compete with the
licensees with the manufacturer's promise not directly to supply any other
distributor in a designated area. It wrongly concluded that unlike territo-
rial sales restrictions imposed upon licensees, the licensor's promise not to
compete does not necessarily restrict competition in violation of Article
85(1).68
The need to protect new technology (INRA developed the seeds af-
ter years of research and experimentation) 69 and new market entry7" per-
suaded the Court that aspects of the INRA-Nungesser arrangement
constituting an open exclusive license were valid as long as the license did
not affect the position of third parties, such as parallel importers and
licensees for other territories.71 Especially in the case of market entry of
a new technology, a licensee might be reluctant to devote the resources
necessary to develop the market if it did not have some protection against
competition from licensees in other territories or from the licensor itself.
Further, without the dissemination of the new technology, interbrand
competition between the new product and similar existing products
Article 2. Turner, Competition and the Common Market After Maize Seeds, 8 EUR. L. REv. 103,
109 (1983). Article 2(1)(b) of Regulation 67/67 specifies, inter alia, that a restriction may be im-
posed upon the exclusive dealer to refrain (outside the contract territory) from seeking customers for
the goods to which the contract relates, from establishing any branch, or from maintaining any
distribution depot. Regulation 67/67 is now supplanted by Regulation 1983/83; see supra note 27
and accompanying text.
66 Nungesser, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2068, % 54, [1983] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 352-53,
I 54.
67 Id. at 2073-74, 2076, 11 77, 91, [1983] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 356, 358, I 77, 91.
68 Joliet, supra note 46, at 765 (footnotes omitted).
69 Nungesser, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2069, S 56, [1983] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 353, 1 56.
70 Id. at 2069, 1 57, [1983] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 353, 1 57.
71 Id. % 58, [1983] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 353, 1 58.
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would be affected.72
Thus, the Court takes an approach to the issues in Nungesser that
emphasizes the "economic nature and consequences of the behavior in-
volved."7 3 Rather than applying an overly legalistic approach, the Court
in this case gave more weight to "the actual effect of the agreement on
competition. Therefore, it would prefer a factual analysis of the competi-
tive significance of an agreement to the preservation of theoretical com-
petition at all costs."'74
In Nungesser, the Court's application of Article 85(3) language to an
Article 85(1) determination is similar to its application in Pronuptia. The
Court in Nungesser used a "new technology" argument to justify directly
an Article 85(1) exclusion instead of using it to support an Article 85(3)
exemption. Indeed, the language of Article 85(3) cites "technical or eco-
nomic progress" as a reason to declare the provisions of Article 85(1)
inapplicable to an undertaking. In Nungesser, the Court appears to be
more flexible in its approach than the Commission, which accepted the
argument, but used it to grant an Article 85(3) exemption.75
Whereas the Court in Nungesser balanced the "gains of interbrand
competition against the loss of intrabrand competition," and developed
the open exclusive license concept, in Pronuptia the Court pulled back
from an expansion of allowable territorial restrictions. It rejected them
"without any realistic economic analysis of the necessity for such provi-
sions."'76 In Pronuptia, the Court looked to the plight of franchisees and
noted only that
It is certainly possible that a prospective franchisee may not want to take
the risk of joining the chain and making his investment, paying a relatively
high entry fee and agreeing to pay a considerable annual fee, if he were not
in a position to hope that his business would be profitable thanks to a cer-
tain amount of protection from competition by the franchisor and other
franchisees.7 7
Having said that, the Court in Pronuptia advocated only a resort to Arti-
cle 85(3) procedures,78 whereas such a rationale in Nungesser justified
partial territorial restraints. It is disappointing that in Pronuptia the
Court did not apply the new market entry rationale to permit some terri-
torial relief for franchisees as it did for licensees.
72 Id. 57, [1983] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 353, 57.
73 Forrester & Norall, supra note 55, at 39.
74 Y. Jeanrenaud, Exclusive Licenses of Patent Rights and Territorial Restraints Under EEC
Law 29 (1985)(unpublished LL.M. thesis, Northwestern University Law Library).
75 Forrester & Norall, supra note 55, at 39.
76 Venit, supra note 19, at 218.
77 Pronuptia, [1986] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 444-45, 1] 24.
78 See infra notes 53-56, 99, 103, 108 and accompanying text.
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IV. PROGRESS TOWARDS A RULE OF REASON?
The Court's use of a "strictly necessary" test in Pronuptia, to deter-
mine which franchise clauses are necessary to preserve the essential as-
pects of franchising, might advance the eventual adoption of a modified
version of the United States courts' "rule of reason." The rule has been
defined as a "consideration of impact on competitive conditions .. .
whether the challenged agreement is one that promotes competition or
one that suppresses competition."79 In his classic 1967 study of reason-
ableness tests from a comparative perspective, Professor Joliet discussed
the rule of reason within the context of the Sherman Act:
The question of reasonableness is a question of degree .... The judicial
discretion only relates to the significance of the restraint. Not every agree-
ment by which a trader limits his freedom and ability to compete is auto-
matically deemed an excessive restriction of market competition. When the
agreement under attack falls short of an anticompetitive result, business
considerations and good motives can be adduced to show that no wrongful
purpose has inspired the conduct.80
Similarly in the EEC, in considering whether a rule of reason can be
utilized in EEC competition law, it should be noted that not all restraints
on competition violate Article 85(1). Article 85(1) is meant to identify
those restraints seriously restricting competition in the EEC, as enunci-
ated in the policy statements of the EEC Treaty. Thus, an Article 85(1)
exclusion is not necessarily equal in degree to an Article 85(3) exemption.
In Pronuptia, the Court's careful analysis, with its explanation that
many franchise clauses are strictly necessary to protect know-how and to
protect network identity and reputation, supplies the economic context
required for a rule of reason application. Unfortunately, the Court did
not then go beyond the threshold and actually conclude that some terri-
79 See generally National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 686-92
(1978)(Stevens, J.)(presenting a definition and brief history of the rule of reason). The rule, a con-
cept with its origins in English common law (see Mitchel v. Reynolds, I P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep.
347 (1711), the leading case), requires that a restraint be evaluated for its impact on competitive
conditions. If the restraint merely regulates, and thus may promote competition, it is considered
ancillary and therefore a reasonable restraint on competition. Professor Joliet remarks that in his
view, Justice Stevens's opinion in National Society of Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 687-92,
provides the best restatement of the rule of reason. Joliet, supra note 46, at 773 n.68. See Board of
Trade of the City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)("The true test of legality is
whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition
or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.").
Professor Pescatore has commented on guidelines used by the Court of Justice: "The case-law
shows that the Court may use as a guideline any rule of law coming under the broad definition of
Article 164, i.e., not only rules of Community law but also general principles of law and, where
appropriate, rules of international law." P. PESCATORE, supra note 1, at 17.
80 R. JOLIET, THE RULE OF REASON IN ANTITRUST LAW 6-7 (1967). Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-7 (1982).
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torial restraints were necessary to protect the franchisee's investment.
Yet, the Court's language set up the possibility for a future application of
the rule of reason.
The Court's stress on a "strictly necessary" test for Article 85(1)
instead of Article 85(3) could be explained by examining how "restraint
of competition" is defined. Professor Joliet has presented the choice
thus:
If a restriction on intrabrand competition automatically brings into play the
section 1 prohibition, the Commission should consider the favorable effects
on interbrand competition only as it examines whether the agreement quali-
fies for section three exemption. If, however, a restraint of competition is
defined as a restraint of market competition at large, as opposed to a mere
limitation on intrabrand competition, the section 1 stage of analysis already
involves a Rule of Reason approach. The second view has the advantage of
freeing the Commission from issuing numerous decisions for cases where
the restriction is likely to be exempted under Article 85(3). The Commis-
sion could then concentrate its time and energies on those cases where det-
rimental effects on intrabrand competition are not outweighed by positive
effects on interbrand competition.
In the Pronuptia case, Advocate General VerLoren van Themaat
presented a survey of twelve Court decisions, most of which could sup-
port a rule of reason approach. Because of the similarities in the cases,
the Advocate General also examined the United States Supreme Court
case, Continental T. V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 2 That case concerned
the validity of a franchise agreement between a manufacturer of televi-
sion sets and a retailer; the agreement barred the retailer from selling
franchised products from a location other than the one specified in the
agreement. The Sylvania Court rejected aper se rule of illegality on non-
price vertical restraints (including location restrictions) as well as abso-
lute territorial restrictions. The Sylvania Court held that location restric-
tions should be judged under the rule of reason standard.
81 Joliet, supra note 46, at 803-04 (footnotes omitted). Sutherland, supra note 20, at 155-56,
criticizes finding a rule of reason in Article 85(1):
[A]t best, it caricatures and, at worst, it distorts what the Commission does in its decisions ....(A]rticle 85(3) is, in a way, our rule of reason. We do not have per se infringements of Article
85(1), and every case is considered under Article 85(1) on its merits. The reasonable approach
under Article 85(1) has already thrown up some areas in which apparent restrictions are re-
vealed on analyses to be innocent after all in competition terms if kept within certain bounds.
Community law therefore has a two stage approach: under Article 85(1) a market analysis is
carried out to determine whether there is a restriction or distortion of competition and, if so,
whether it is appreciable; then, and only then, Article 85(3), a statutory, even constitutional,
rule of reason, is applied in order to consider whether, in all the circumstances, the arrangement
in question presents objective advantages justifying an exemption.
But see Joliet, infra note 87; McCullough, supra note 55, at 808 n.17 (complex evaluation under
Article 85(3) factors creates more uncertainty than does the competition analysis of the United
States rule of reason).
82 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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The Advocate General's approach is similar to that advanced by
Professor Joliet, who has emphasized the rule of reason's stimulation of
interbrand competition by allowing certain territorial restraints.83 The
Advocate General concludes that the main issue lies in horizontal effects,
that is, "the results of the agreement for third parties."84 Based on his
analysis of the prior European Court decisions, he sets forth three crite-
ria which he believes the Court should use to judge the validity of
franchise contracts: "1) whether parallel imports remain possible;
2) whether, having regard to the market position of the suppliers con-
cerned, access to the market for other suppliers or dealers is restricted;
and 3) whether the agreement results in price increases or involves price
fixing .... "85 The Court reached a similar conclusion in its judgment,
but outlawed territorial restrictions except as exempted under Article
85(3) procedures.
In a discussion of selective distribution systems and the Court's de-
cision in Metro GmbH v. Commission,86 one commentator characterized
the rule of reason as "weigh[ing] the outsider's interest in easy access to
the manufacturer's selling network, the manufacturer's interest in com-
mercial goodwill, the dealer's interest in maintaining prices and the con-
sumer's interest in easily available high quality products at low prices."87
Such a rule of reason could be directly applicable to Pronuptia, and the
assessment of what constitutes "strictly necessary" includes sensitivity to
these interests. The Pronuptia decision is another step forward in the
establishment of a rule of reason for the Court of Justice. One commen-
tator has observed that "[a] common tactic [of the Court] is to introduce
a new doctrine gradually." 8 In addition to the Court decisions cited by
the Advocate General, this insight is borne out by Commission decisions
83 See generally Joliet, supra note 46.
84 Pronuptia, [1986] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 434.
85 Id. (footnotes omitted). Van Empel has made the following observation on the difference
between the Advocate General's approach and the Court's reasoning:
[Iln the approach of the Advocate General it would seem that all the ordinary cases (either
black or white) could be dealt with by the national courts, whilst the Commission would be
responsible for dealing with the marginal cases on an individual basis. On the contrary, in the
approach of the Court the Commission is made responsible for scrutinizing at least all those
franchise contracts containing a "location clause" and/or a "pricing clause."
Van Empel, supra note 9, at 413.
86 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1875, [1978] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 1.
87 Van Houtte, A Standard of Reason in EEC Antitrust Law: Some Comments on the Application
of Parts 1 and 3 ofArticle 85, 4 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 497, 502 (1982). Professor Joliet has
commented that the decision in National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs "definitely quieted the often
made assertion (especially by European writers, see Van Houtte... ) that the Rule of Reason can
justify anticompetitive agreements in the name of expediency." Joliet, supra note 46, at 773 n.68
(citing Van Houtte, A Standard of Reason, at 498, 498 n.8).
88 T. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNIrY LAW 60 (1981).
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which also support a rule of reason approach. 89
Professor Joliet has also argued that territorial sales restrictions
should not be condemned outright (that is, should not be deemed per se
illegal). "If they serve the interest of interbrand competition by helping a
new entrant, who could not otherwise find investors to put up the capital
necessary to manufacture and market the product, they ought to turn out
to be legal."9 This argument could be transferred almost in toto to fran-
chising, with the small business entrepreneur as the party experiencing
entry barriers. However, since the Court in Pronuptia held that territo-
rial restraints must be addressed by an Article 85(3) exemption, theper se
prohibition on territorial restrictions established by Consten and Grundig
remains.
In summary, the Pronuptia decision advanced the establishment of a
rule of reason by allowing ancillary restraints strictly necessary to pre-
serve the essence of a franchise arrangement to be applied in interpreting
Article 85(l).91 The Pronuptia reasoning, in which "anti-competitive ef-
fect, actual or intended, [must] be shown before clauses are declared void
89 See generally Van Houtte, supra note 87.
90 Joliet, supra note 46, at 803.
91 But see Korah, EEC Competition Policy, supra note 20, at 101:
This judgment seems to reject the rule of reason in the United States.... When describing the
advantages of franchised distribution, the Court did not conclude that it increases competition,
merely that it does not, in itself, restrict it, and that the minimal restrictions required to make it
viable are outside the prohibition on Article 85(1).
Contra Goebel, Case 161/84, supra note 36, at 693-94:
The ruling seems to reflect a more flexible approach to the scope of Article 85(1) (whether
formally characterized as a "rule of reason" or not)....
It is quite surprising that the Court never indicates the need to appraise a franchising
agreement, or a franchise network in operation, in its over-all market context... Given rather
obvious possibilities for abuse of franchising networks under certain market conditions, it might
have been better if the Court's virtual "rule of reason" blessing of franchising had been limited
by a reference to the need to review market impact before absolutely concluding there is no
violation of Article 85(1) at all. The Court appears to have gone further than American prece-
dents and it may be queried whether this was wise in an initial leading precedent.
Van Empel, supra note 9, at 411, also argues for a rule of reason in the Pronuptia case:
[H]ere (again) the Court has accepted to apply a "rule of reason" similar to the one in regular
use in American anti-trust law. Others prefer to see this as a normal application of the per se
provisions of Article 85(1) under somewhat exceptional circumstances. Be that as it may, what
is essential for the present purpose, is that the Court accepts the consideration of contract
clauses within the context of the overall relationship of the parties, and what is still more impor-
tant, accepts that certain negative (from the competition law point of view, that is) clauses are
simply the inescapable corollary of certain clauses which constitute the "pith and marrow" of
the unique form of cooperation which is franchising.
Goebel further reasons that "[tihe Court appears to imply that franchising is pro-competitive in
nature, in that it allows 'independent traders' (presumably small and medium-sized entrepreneurs) to
open new retail outlets in competition with more established forms of business." Goebel, Case
161/84, supra note 36, at 687.
For a discussion of whether Article 85(1) could encompass a rule of reason, see II B. HAWK,
U.S., COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST 77-87 (2d ed. 1986). For an earlier
discussion, see Salzman, Analogies Between United States and Common Market Antitrust Law in the
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may enable a large number of important contracts to be enforced."92
The deficiencies of the decision lie in the area of territorial restrictions.
Absolute territorial restraints are prohibited in the EEC, but Nungesser's
open exclusive licenses allowed some flexibility. Pronuptia did not reaf-
firm Nungesser's advance. Thus, territorial restrictions in franchising
will continue to be considered only within the context of an Article 85(3)
exemption.
V. REACTION TO THE DECISION AND CASE DEVELOPMENTS
Shortly after the Court issued the Pronuptia decision, Commissioner
Peter Sutherland, who is responsible for competition law policy at the
Commission, announced that an Article 85(3) block exemption would
probably be prepared approximately two years after the decision (thus a
target date of 1988). The block exemption would be based on the Com-
mission's experience with individual franchise cases. 93 The block exemp-
tion would likely include an opposition procedure,94 and the two
essential franchisor clauses cited in the decision must be present for the
future block exemption to apply. Resale price maintenance is not a re-
striction which any future block exemption would include.
Sutherland also noted that the future block exemption might con-
tain restrictive clauses which would make it difficult for parties to the
franchise agreements to compete with each other (e.g., selling outside the
shop or opening of a second shop forbidden). In specific situations, these
clauses could meet the Article 85(3) conditions. The franchisees should
be free to buy and sell from each other inside the EEC, and the franchise
network must be organized to exercise product warranty throughout the
entire EEC. Sutherland noted that the judgment left open the assessment
Field of Distribution, 13 INT'L LAW. 47, 60-66 (1979); see also Schechter, The Rule of Reason in
European Competition Law, L. IssuEs EUR. INTEGRATION 1 (1982).
92 Korah, EEC Competition Policy, supra note 20, at 103.
93 In his speech, Franchise Agreements Under EEC Competition Rules, given at the Pronuptia
Conference, supra note 4.
94 Waelbroek explains the opposition procedure:
The Commission has recently introduced a new "opposition procedure" into various block ex-
emption regulations, with the purpose of accelerating the procedure of settlement of a case.
According to this procedure, agreements which contain clauses which are neither explicitly
exempted, nor on the "black list" of expressly prohibited clauses, are deemed to be exempt if
they are notified to the Commission, and no "opposition" is raised within six months....
The importance of this new procedure can hardly be overestimated. The Commission
hopes that it will result in more rapid decisions, in increased legal security, and in a lightening
of its workload, thus freeing the competent services to deal more quickly and efficiently with the
remaining cases.
Waelbroeck, New Forms of Settlement of Antitrust Cases and Procedural Safeguards: Is Regulation
17 Falling Into Abeyance?, 11 EUR. L. Rav., 268, 272 (1986). Forrester & Norall, supra note 55, at
43 n.29, criticize the opposition procedure because it is still a notification procedure.
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of franchise agreements under Article 85(3), except for the ruling that
they cannot benefit from Regulation 67/67. (Regulation 83/83 replaced
Regulation 67/67 relative to exclusive distribution agreements, but in
Sutherland's view the difference between them is not such as to justify a
different conclusion.)
Since Sutherland's reaction to the Pronuptia decision, the Commis-
sion has issued three individual Article 85(3) exemptions for franchising
agreements and published a draft block exemption on franchising agree-
ments. The three individual exemptions address territorial restraints and
other factors cited in the Pronuptia decision.
The master franchising agreement for the Pronuptia organization
was one of the three individual exemptions granted. While the Pronuptia
case was pending before the Court, the franchisor Pronuptia de Paris
requested an Article 85(3) exemption from the Commission in accord-
ance with Regulation 17 procedures." At the Commission's request,
Pronuptia de Paris amended the standard agreement explicitly to provide
certain rights to the franchisee which were implicitly recognized under
earlier contracts. These rights included the following: 1) the franchisee
may purchase Pronuptia products from other franchisees; 2) the fran-
chisee may purchase goods not connected with the essential object of the
franchise from suppliers of its own choice, subject to ex post facto quali-
tative vetting96 by the franchisor; 3) the franchisee may set its own selling
prices and is not bound by the franchisor's guidance prices. After receiv-
ing comments from interested parties,97 the Commission approved the
proposed agreement on December 22, 1986.98 The Commission permit-
ted the Pronuptia organization to retain clauses giving the franchisee ter-
ritorial exclusivity, based on its finding that such clauses were
indispensable to induce the prospective franchisee to pay the "substantial
initial fee to enter the franchise system ... [and be] provided with some
protection against competition from other franchisees and from the
franchisor in the allotted territory." 99
A second individual exemption was granted to the standard
franchise agreements of Yves Rocher, a French manufacturer of cosmet-
95 See supra note 55.
96 Vetting is expert examination or appraisal.
97 Franchise Agreement Due for Approval Under Competition Rules, 29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C
178) 2 (1986), 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 110,799 (July 31, 1986). The Commission published
an official notice requesting comments from interested parties on the proposed exception.
98 Exemption From Competition Rules for Pronuptia Franchise Agreement, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 13) 39 (1987), 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) % 10,854 (Feb. 26, 1987).
99 Id. The Commission's rationale for approving the location clauses follows closely the Court's
reasoning in the Pronuptia decision. Pronuptia, [1986] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 444-45, 24. See
infra notes 53-56, 76-78, 103, 108 and accompanying text.
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ics, on December 17, 1986.1°° The Commission found that the franchise
agreements were more than distribution contracts, because the franchisor
undertook to transfer commercial know-how and supply technical and
commercial assistance. The agreements required, inter alia, that the
franchisor grant an exclusive right to the franchisee to retail the Yves
Rocher products within a specified area. Although such restraints fell
within the terms of Article 85(1), an Article 85(3) exemption was granted
because the combined effect of the franchise clauses promoted interbrand
competition. Since the exclusive territory was not large, and since fran-
chisees could sell to any customer, competition between the franchisees
was ensured. 10 1
The third individual exemption was granted on July 13, 1987, to
Computerland, a system of franchised outlets selling microcomputer
products."0 2 Like the Pronuptia and Yves Rocher franchise systems, the
Computerland system provided for franchisor assistance and allowed for
the transmission of know-how to the franchisee. Further, the Computer-
land franchise agreements contained several clauses falling within the
scope of Article 85(1): 1) granting of exclusive territory to the franchisor
via location clauses; 2) prohibition of the franchisee's opening another
outlet without the franchisor's approval; and 3) allowing sales only to
end-users or other franchisees. An individual Article 85(3) exemption
was granted, inter alia, because the improved distribution system benefit-
ted consumers who could buy from knowledgeable personnel, and be-
cause of vigorous competition in microcomputer retail sales.
Based on its experience with the three individual Article 85(3) ex-
emptions, the Commission issued a draft regulation on August 27, 1987,
exempting franchising agreements from Article 85(1) coverage. The
draft regulation covers industrial franchises (manufacturing goods) and
distribution franchises (retailing of goods by a producer or distributor); it
does not exempt service franchises (supply of services) because of their
unique characteristics. The draft regulation, which also covers third
party master franchisors, defines franchising agreements as licenses of
"intangible property rights concerning trade marks or signs and know-
100 Yves Rocher Franchise Contracts Exempted from Competition Rules, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 8) 49 (1987), 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) % 10,855 (Feb. 26, 1987).
101 Id. See also Pronuptia, Yves Rocher Franchises Gain Clearances from EC Commission, 52
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 138-39 (Jan. 22, 1987); Competition: By Authorising Pronuptia
and Yves Rocher Agreements The European Commission Has Defined Legal Terms for Distribution
Franchising, Europe, No. 4457, Dec. 22-23, 1986, at 8.
102 Computerland Franchising System is Exempt Under EC's Competition Rules, 30 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 222) 12 (1987), 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,906 (Aug. 27, 1987). See also EC
Commission Gives Green Light to Computerland Franchise Agreements, 53 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. 174 (July 30, 1987).
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how, which can be combined with restrictions relating to supply or
purchase." It notes that franchises are based on a uniform system, know-
how, and commercial or technical assistance from the franchisor. Fur-
ther, the draft regulations allows location clauses granting territorial pro-
tection to the franchisee. 1 3 The draft regulation's format is similar to
other block exemption regulations, and it does include the opposition
procedure.1 4 Other features of the draft regulation are similar to the
three individual Article 85(3) exemptions discussed above. Comments
on the draft were accepted until November 1, 1987.
Reaction to the Pronuptia decision from the international franchis-
ing community has generally been favorable, subject to certain reserva-
tions and points that need clarification.1"5 One immediate problem for
the franchising industry is the Court's treatment of reciprocal exclusivity
clauses. Until the Commission issues the final block exemption clarifying
its policy on acceptable territorial restraints, requests for individual ex-
emptions under Article 85(3) may have to be notified to the Commis-
sion.1"6 Another issue concerns the severability of offending franchise
clauses by the national courts in the Member States. Some Member
States may hold that an offending franchise clause renders the entire
agreement void, while other states simply sever the prohibited clauses.
Thus, franchisors may be unable to enforce their franchise agreements,
including the payment of franchise fees, until the agreements receive spe-
cific exemption under Article 85(3).107 The Commission's interpretation
of the judgment will go far to eliminate such uncertainties.
Some issues raised by the Court may prove to be academic in the
light of practical experience. For example, although the Court recog-
nizes that a new franchisee will want territorial protection of his invest-
ment, the franchisor is unlikely to sell two franchises located close
enough to cause one of the franchises to fail due to market concentration.
From the franchisee's perspective, a new entrant is unlikely to buy a
franchise too close to another franchisee.0 8
The structure of franchise systems will affect market sharing and
recommended price clauses. The Court correctly noted that franchising
103 Draft Regulation on Application of Article 85(3) to Categories of Franchising Agreements, 4
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,916 (Sept. 10, 1987). See also Agreements Exempt, supra note 11;
Commission Flexibility, supra note 11.
104 See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
105 Clough, supra note 11.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 M. Mendelsohn, Pronuptia-Its Legal and Commercial Consequences, Remarks at the
Pronuptia Conference, supra note 4. See also supra notes 53-56, 76-78, 99, 103, 108 and accompany-
ing text.
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is more than just the sale of a product, but the Commission and possibly
the Court will have to acknowledge that franchising involves a specific
method of operation and "trading infrastructure" as well. Rather than
competing with each other, the franchisor and franchisees "provide an
interdependent trading relationship resembling a multiple network which
competes with others offering similar goods and services. The prices of
these others are the more likely pricing reference point in market
terms."10 9 It is to be hoped that the Commission's experience with the
three individual Article 85(3) franchising exemptions, its draft franchis-
ing regulation, and the business community's comments to the draft reg-
ulation will enable the Commission to prepare a final franchising
regulation sufficient to address the concerns of the international franchis-
ing community.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Pronuptia decision is both significant and incomplete. Its obvi-
ous significance is its recognition of franchising as an independent legal
concept. By defining franchising's terms for its own purposes, the Court
has created a legal vehicle to accomplish its goal of a single integrated
market, promoting the free movement of goods with no territorial re-
strictions. Franchising is no longer the stepchild of licensing or exclu-
sive/selective distribution networks.
Also significant is the Court's sanction of ancillary restraints neces-
sary to protect the essential elements of a distribution franchise relation-
ship. The Court defines Article 85(1) coverage in terms of these
restraints and thereby liberalizes its earlier policy and previous decisions
interpreting Article 85. Though the Court has not adopted a rule of rea-
son by its decision in Pronuptia, the decision forecasts a cautious step in
that direction.
Since the Court chose this opportunity to recognize the economic
force and individual nature of franchise relationships, it has given a pow-
erful tool to the Community to use franchise agreements to further the
goal of a single common market. The Court's early recognition of
franchising is to be applauded. However, the Court has failed to transfer
to franchising the machinery already established in Nungesser to give li-
censing some relief from territorial prohibitions. It is in this respect that
Pronuptia is incomplete; some territorial protection is needed for eco-
nomic vitality outside the context of an Article 85(3) exemption.
It is difficult to understand why the Court in Pronuptia retreated
109 d.
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from the opportunity to extend territorial protection to another unique
economic endeavor. The Court's jurisprudence enunciated in Consten
and Grundig against absolute territorial barriers would not have been
threatened by open exclusive "licenses" for franchisees. However, the
Court in Pronuptia backed away from the opportunity to extend Nun-
gesser's permissive view of territorial restraints, even though both deci-
sions cited Consten and Grundig as the basis for their reasoning. It
conservatively referred potential franchisees to Article 85(3) exemptions
to protect their investments.
For reasons that are not clear, the Court in Pronuptia valued
licenses as qualitatively superior to franchises, even though franchisees
could use virtually the same economic argument that licensees could. By
insisting on the 1966 concerns of Consten and Grundig instead of the
1982 economic advances of Nungesser, the Court in Pronuptia empha-
sizes that its goal of a single common market overrides an equally com-
pelling argument that certain economic arrangements need some
territorial protection to function as they should. The decision does,
nonetheless, bestow legal certainty on the status of franchise agreements.
Eileen R. Hurley
